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INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT ANNUAL 
CASE LAW UPDATE AND COMMENTARY 
 
Kathryn E. Fort and Adrian T. Smith• 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
There are, on average, 200 appellate cases addressing the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) annually—though this number 
includes published and unpublished opinions.1 There are usually 
around thirty reported state appellate court cases involving ICWA 
issues every year. There has never been a systematic look at the 
cases on appeal including an analysis of who is appealing, what the 
primary issues are on appeal, and what trends are present. This 
article seeks to fill that void.  
This article provides a comprehensive catalog of published 
ICWA jurisprudence from across all fifty states in 2017. Designed 
as a quick reference for the ICWA practitioner, this article 
summarizes key case decisions that have interpreted the law in 
meaningful, significant, or surprising ways. It also tracks current 
attempts by ICWA’s opponents to overturn the law. By providing an 
overview of last year’s ICWA cases, this article is meant to keep 
practitioners up-to-date so they can be effective in the juvenile 
courtroom without sorting through and reading the dozens of cases 
published across all fifty jurisdictions.  
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1978, Congress recognized “that the States, exercising 
their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings 
through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the 
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and 
                                                 
• Kathryn E. Fort is the Director of the Indian Law Clinic at Michigan State 
University College of Law and runs the ICWA Appellate Project. She graduated 
from MSU College of Law in 2005. Adrian (Addie) T. Smith is an attorney with 
Youth, Rights & Justice in Portland, Oregon, and was previously the 
Government Affairs and Advocacy Staff Attorney at the Nation Indian Child 
Welfare Association. She graduated from Washington University in St. Louis 
Schools of Law and Social Work in 2012.  
1 Data on file with the authors and journal. 
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families” and that this led to “an alarmingly high percentage of 
Indian families [being] broken up by the removal, often 
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and 
private agencies.”2 To address this nationwide issue, Congress 
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act.3 ICWA creates “minimum 
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their 
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive 
homes” that state administrative and judicial bodies must follow and 
enforce.4  
Because of this fundamental structure—a federal law, 
interpreted and litigated in state courts—tracking appellate litigation 
interpreting ICWA is relatively easy. Indeed, state court decisions 
make up the body of ICWA case law and have influence beyond the 
state in which they are decided. That is because state courts often 
turn to “sister jurisdictions” when deciding matters related to ICWA 
precisely because it is a federal law applied across the states.5 For 
this reason, unlike other child dependency attorneys, an ICWA 
practitioner has to stay up to date on decisions from across the 
country in addition to decisions in their home state. This can be 
particularly difficult for those with an active caseload and limited 
access to legal databases, such as in-house tribal ICWA attorneys, 
parents’ attorneys, and child advocates (including guardians ad 
litem or children’s attorneys). It has become increasingly evident 
that practitioners are in need of an annual published account of the 
                                                 
2 25 U.S.C. § 1901-1963 (4)–(5) (1978). 
3 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 (1978). For an overview of ICWA’s provisions, 
requirements, and an introduction to the law, see A Practical Guide to the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND,  
https://www.narf.org/nill/documents/icwa/ [ https://perma.cc/M6Q3-W4ZP]; 
B.J. JONES ET AL., THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK (2nd ed. 2008); 
Indian Child Welfare Act Judicial Benchbook, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE 
AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, 
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/NCJFCJ_Benchbook_Final_Web.pdf. 
4 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1978). 
5 See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. J.G., 317 P.3d 936, 945 n.11 (Or. Ct. App. 
2014) (looking to decisions of sister states when interpreting the Act); In re 
Esther V., 248 P.3d 863, 871 (N.M. 2011); In re Welfare of R.S., 805 N.W.2d 
44, 65 (Minn. 2011); In re A.R., 310 P.3d 1007, 1014 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012). See 
In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 19 (Colo. App. 2007) (for a discussion of cases from 
the “several states” regarding ICWA’s application in step-parent adoptions), 
which was cited to in In re Adoption of T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492 (Wash. 2016) 
(applying WICWA to step-parent adoptions), which was further cited to and 
discussed in S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) 
(applying ICWA to a private abandonment and step-parent adoption 
proceeding). 
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cases.6 Although much of family law is under the purview of the 
states,7 ICWA, which is grounded in the federal government’s trust 
responsibility to tribes and Indian people, holds a unique place in 
child welfare jurisprudence.8 It is a federal law that must be 
implemented in state courts—jurisdictions where there can be a 
great deal of legislative diversity.9  
ICWA’s provisions include, among other elements, 
requirements that a state inquire into the membership status of a 
tribal child,10 provide tribes and parents notice of child welfare 
proceedings,11 ensure that tribes are given the opportunity to 
intervene in the such proceedings,12 transfer jurisdiction to the tribal 
court,13 provide active efforts,14 and present testimony of a qualified 
expert witness15 before placing an Indian child in foster care or 
                                                 
6 In 2017 alone, Professor Fort’s clinic handled inquiries in sixty-three different 
cases from more than thirty tribes handling cases in more than twenty states. 
Additionally, for the past few years, Professor Fort has been collecting ICWA 
cases and discussing them online, and the need for a formal compendium has 
become increasingly obvious based on the inquiries from around the country 
that both authors have received on a weekly basis. See ICWA Appellate Project, 
TURTLETALK, https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/icwa/. 
7 But see generally JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (2014) 
(arguing family law has long been the purview of the federal government and 
the states, despite Supreme Court dicta stating otherwise). 
8 See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1)–(2) (1978). 
9 While federal funding under IV-E of the Social Security Act requires states to 
pass certain standards for foster care placements and termination of parental 
rights, there are many areas of state law that vary by state. See, e.g., Consent to 
Adoption (2017), CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8L9-
NJEQ]; Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings 
(2014), CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/represent.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3QZ-
NN7T]; Rights of Unmarried Fathers (2014), CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION 
GATEWAY, https://perma.cc/LBK7-3N35; Definition of Child Abuse and Neglect 
(2016), CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5Q7-
D9N7]. Even in an area where state law is arguably quite similar—child abuse 
and neglect cases, for example—the vocabulary across the states varies 
tremendously. Indeed, the authors of this article debated whether to call them 
“abuse and neglect cases” (Michigan terminology) or “child dependency cases” 
(Oregon terminology).  
10 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1978). 
11 Id. 
12 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1978). 
13 Id. at §1911(b). 
14 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1978). 
15 Id. at §1912 (e)-(f). 
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terminating the parental rights to the Indian child, both under 
heightened burdens of proof.16   
Courts have interpreted ICWA to apply in conjunction with, 
and in some instances on top of, state child welfare laws.17 When an 
Indian child, as defined in the law, is subject to a child custody 
proceeding, also defined in the law, state courts must follows its 
standards and implement its protections.18 Though ICWA is not the 
only federal intrusion into state child welfare proceedings, it is one 
of the few laws that Congress has not required states to incorporate 
into their codes in order to receive federal child welfare funding. 
While many states have incorporated parts of the Act only a handful 
have passed comprehensive Indian child welfare acts.19 
To best serve the active practitioner, this article first provides 
an overview of case data, including information on where there were 
reported and unreported decisions interpreting ICWA, what 
provisions courts most commonly interpreted, and what themes 
arose in 2017. The article then provides descriptive commentary on 
a handful of 2017 state and federal cases that best illuminate the 
described themes. It closes with a full compendium of 2017 cases, 
which is topically organized for those practitioners who may not 
have access to this information.   
 
II. SUMMARY OF THE DATA AND NATIONAL TRENDS 
 
As the numbers illustrate, ICWA is litigated more often than 
non-practitioners might imagine. State courts of appeal interpret the 
                                                 
16 Id.  
17 See In re K.S.D, 904 N.W.2d 479, 482 (N.D. 2017); Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dept. 
of Economic Sec., 198 P.3d 1203, 1207 (Ariz. 2009)(collecting cases).  
18 25 U.S.C § 1903(1); see also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42 (1989) (applying ICWA in “child custody 
proceedings” involving an “Indian child” as defined by the Act). 
19 See, e.g., Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act, MCL 712B.1-41. MICH. 
COMP. 712B.1-.41 (2013) (comprehensive state ICWA); Minnesota Indian 
Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 260.751-835. (2015) (comprehensive 
state ICWA); Washington Indian Child Welfare Act, WASH. REV. CODE 
§§13.38.010-190. (2011) (comprehensive state ICWA); Nebraska Indian Child 
Welfare Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1501-1516 (2015) (comprehensive state 
ICWA); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-453 (A) (20) (2014) (merely requiring 
compliance with ICWA); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-126 (2002) (requiring 
compliance with ICWA, specifically provisions related to inquiry, notification, 
determination, transfer to tribal court); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 419A.116, 419B.090, 
118, 150, 171, 185, 192, 340, 365, 366, 452, 476, 498, 500, 875, 878, 923 
(imbedding ICWA standards in relevant areas across Oregon’s dependency 
code).  
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law across the country at a rate of one every other day. There are, on 
average, 200 appellate cases annually—including published and 
unpublished opinions.20 While unpublished opinions cannot be used 
as precedent, the authors include those cases in the numbers here. 
The question of why so many ICWA cases are unpublished is an 
unanswered one. A vast majority of these unpublished opinions 
addressed the issue of inquiry and notice—an area so common and 
well-established that there may no longer be a need to report these 
opinions—but beyond this topic, no clear pattern in unpublished 
cases emerges. For example, eight active efforts cases were 
unreported, as were three placement preference cases and three 
determinations regarding whether the case was a foster care 
proceeding under ICWA. In one case, Washington’s court of 
appeals spent considerable time discussing and weighing one of the 
most important questions in an ICWA case—who may be a qualified 
expert witness (QEW) as required by the law?21 The opinion is 
unreported, however, so the ultimate holding—that a tribal social 
worker who is a member of the tribe she works for may be a QEW—
has no legal precedent in Washington.22 While there is no clear 
reason for the sheer number of unreported ICWA cases, not 
counting or reading them severely understates the state ICWA 
appellate docket. The authors have only summarized reported cases, 
but practitioners may want to keep in mind that unreported ones may 
still provide significant legal research and reasoning useful to their 
case work. 
 Generally, thirty ICWA cases are reported in state appellate 
courts every year. However, there has never been a systematic look 
at the cases on appeal that includes an analysis of who is appealing, 
what the primary issues are on appeal, and what trends are present. 
Legal databases make both published and unpublished cases more 
readily available to practitioners and scholars, but the sheer volume 
of cases can be overwhelming. The authors of this article read every 
case as they were released through daily alerts from both Westlaw 
and LexisNexis. Each case was coded by the primary ICWA topic 
                                                 
20 Data on file with the authors and journal. 
21 In re Dependency of K.S., 199 Wash. App. 1034 (2017) (unpublished 
opinion); 25 U.S.C.§ 1912(e)–(f) (1978). 
22 In re Dependency of K.S., 199 Wash. App. 1034. 
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on appeal.23 The cases were also coded with the date, the court, the 
child’s tribe,24 the appellant, and how the court ruled.25 
 In 2017 there were 214 appealed ICWA cases. 26 Thirty-four 
of those cases were published.27 Supreme Courts in Alaska (six 
cases), Montana (two cases), Arizona, Nevada, Utah, South Dakota, 
Vermont, and North Dakota all decided ICWA cases this year, and 
all of them were reported.28 The remaining opinions, published and 
unpublished, were authored by states’ intermediate courts of appeal. 
The number of ICWA appellate cases varied significantly by 
jurisdiction, as does the number of cases which the courts chose to 
report.29  
The most litigated issues were notice and inquiry,30 followed 
by active efforts, termination of parental rights (which includes 
burden of proof issues), placement preferences, transfer to tribal 
court, and issues concerning qualified expert witness testimony.31 
This year more than half of the notice cases were remanded for 
                                                 
23 Active efforts, qualified expert witness, inquiry, notice, transfer to tribal court, 
foster care proceeding (burden of proof), termination of parental rights (burden 
of proof), guardianship, Indian custodian, intervention. 
24 In notice cases, often there are a number of tribes identified as potential tribes 
for the child. We collect up to three named tribes and put them in the order they 
appear in the case.  
25 Affirm, remand, reverse, or dismissed. 
26 Cases are collected from both Westlaw and Lexis over the course of the year 
via case alerts that collect cases from all fifty states and using the search terms 
“Indian Tribe,” “American Indian,” “Native American.” The cases are sorted by 
case name, the date, the court, the state, whether the case is reported or not, the 
top two issues, up to three named tribes, the outcome of the case, and who 
appealed the case. 
27 Data on file with the authors and journal.  
28 It is important to note that Alaska, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota, 
either do not have or use their court of appeals for child welfare cases; In these 
states, appeals are taken directly to the state supreme court. See Section III for a 
summary of these cases. 
29 California leads the states with 152 cases, but only five were reported. 
California has both the most number of cases, and one of the lowest percentages 
of unreported cases at three percent. Alaska is second with six opinions, three 
reported; followed by Michigan and Texas which each had five opinions, two 
reported. Kansas, Arizona, and Washington had a total of four cases. Although, 
Washington did not publish any of their decisions and Kansas and Arizona 
published two and three respectively. Both Arkansas and Utah had three cases, 
although none were reported in Arkansas all three were reported in Utah. 
Montana (2/1), North Carolina (2/1), and Minnesota (2/0) had two. Finally, the 
following states had one ICWA case: Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Missouri, 
Vermont, North Dakota, Illinois, and Wisconsin. 
30 Notice (132), Inquiry (twenty-nine). 
31 Placement Preferences (seven), Active Efforts (ten), Termination of Parental 
Rights (nine), Transfer to Tribal Court (four), and QEW (four). 
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proper notice. Fifty-seven different tribes were named as a child’s 
possible tribe. In twenty-six cases, the tribe was unknown (the 
parent or court did not know the name of tribe). In seventeen cases 
the tribe was unnamed (the court did not record name of the tribe in 
the opinion, sometimes for the purposes of anonymity).  
If a majority of appealed cases were affirmed, that could 
indicate the ICWA appeals are unfounded. However, just under fifty 
percent of the appealed cases were affirmed, which means over fifty 
percent were reversed outright or sent back to the lower court.32  
Finally, of all the cases, only three were appealed by tribes (Navajo 
Nation, Nenana Native Village, and Gila River Indian Community). 
Parents appealed the rest. 
Beyond the numerical breakdown of the data, there are a few 
clear trends in litigation this year. More courts are beginning to use 
and implement the new federal regulations.33 However, because so 
many states were comfortable with, and had precedent concerning, 
the 1979 BIA Guidelines, courts continue to use and cite to the non-
binding 2016 BIA Guidelines34 in their opinions.35 Often the 
language of the new guidelines is echoing the language of the front 
                                                 
32 Of the 214 total appeals, ninety-seven were remanded and six were reversed. 
Of the thirty-four reported cases, only eighteen were affirmed, while fifteen 
were remanded or reversed. Of those fifteen cases, all but two were appealed by 
the parents. 
33 In re K.S.D., 904 N.W.2d 479, 487 (N.D. 2017) (“There is a line of authority 
that upholds termination of parental rights absent an ICWA qualified expert 
witness. We choose to follow the other branch of authority because the United 
States Code and the United States Code of Federal Regulations require—and do 
not merely suggest—that a qualified expert witness testify on 
the ICWA requirements in all ICWA terminations.”). 
34 In 2015 and 2016, there was a flurry of activity on ICWA from the executive 
branch. In 2015, the Bureau of Indian Affairs released the first new Guidelines 
in more than thirty years. These updated Guidelines incorporated much of the 
case law and best practices that had developed around the law since 1978. 
However, in 2016, the Department of the Interior released federal regulations 
regarding ICWA. 25 CFR pt. 23 (2016). These Regulations, after a review and 
comment period, became binding. At the same time, the BIA released 2016 
Guidelines which replaced the 2015 Guidelines and provide interpretation to the 
Regulations. All of this activity created significant confusion in the courts. This 
year’s data indicates that confusion is still working its way through the state 
appellate systems.   
35 See, e.g., L.L., 395 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Colo. App. 2017) ¶ 16 (“Although the 
2016 Guidelines are not binding, we consider them persuasive.”); B.H. v. People 
ex rel. X.H., 138 P.3d 299, 302 n.2 (Colo.2006) (referring to the 1979 
guidelines). This case goes on to provide dual citations to both the Guidelines 
and the Regulations.   
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matter of the new regulations.36 Given state court familiarity with 
ICWA guidelines (on the books since 1979) versus federal 
regulations (rarely, if ever, applied in state court child welfare 
cases), ICWA advocates and practitioners should have predicted this 
outcome. While both the Regulations and the Guidelines came out 
in 2016, there are cases on appeal still addressing underlying 
petitions from 2014 or 2015, forcing courts to determine which 
authority governs their decisions.37 Regardless, the Regulations 
cannot be easily overlooked due to their binding nature. For this 
reason, additional judicial education on the BIA’s 2016 ICWA work 
and the difference between binding regulations and persuasive 
guidelines should be a high priority for child welfare 
organizations.38 
In addition, states are also wrestling with how ICWA applies 
to privately initiated terminations of parental rights. These cases 
include step-parent adoptions, terminations under abandonment 
statutes, and terminations in voluntary adoptions. Generally, the 
trend has been to apply ICWA (or relevant state law) to these cases 
to ensure the parent whose rights are being terminated receives 
notice and protections against a termination. Though decided in 
2016 and not included in this survey, the Washington Supreme 
Court determined the state ICWA law applied to a non-Indian father 
in a step-parent adoption.39 Recently, Arizona held similarly, and 
then Utah found for an unmarried father whose rights were being 
                                                 
36 The Regulations were released with about 100 pages of federal commentary 
responding to the comments to the Regulations and explaining the purposes of 
the Regulations. This commentary can be found at 81 Fed. Reg. 38778 (2016).  
Compare 81 Fed. Reg. 38829 (2016) (“3. Qualified Expert Witness”), with 
Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act 53-4 (Dec. 2016). 
37 Compare In re L.M.B, 398 P.3d 207 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017) (applying 
rescinded 2015 Guidelines), with S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569 n. 5 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2017) (“Rules recently issued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs . . . 
addressing ‘requirements for state courts in ensuring implementation of ICWA 
in Indian child-welfare proceedings’ are informative.”). 
38 See supra note 34. See also In re S.E., 527 S.W.3d 894, 901 n. 5 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2017) (misunderstanding the Tribe’s reliance on binding federal 
regulations as reliance on non-binding guidelines). Some courts still look to 
sister states rather than any federal guidance. See People ex rel. A.O., 896 
N.W.2d 652, 655 (S.D. 2017). Depending on the state, briefing in appellate child 
dependency cases is often confidential. It is difficult to determine what sources 
the briefs provide to the judges. 
39 In re adoption of T.A.W., 354 P.3d 46 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016); see supra note 
6. 
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terminated in a voluntary adoption involving outright fraud.40 
However, at the very end of 2017, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
found that United States Supreme Court precedent meant that a 
parent who had abandoned their child did not get the protections 
ICWA provides.41 
 While this trend of applying ICWA more broadly in state 
courts continued, outside national groups began a federal campaign 
to dismantle ICWA. In 2015, the Goldwater Institute filed a class 
action lawsuit in Arizona federal court.42 Their goal was to get a 
class certified that included every American Indian child in foster 
care and their non-Indian foster parents or prospective adoptive 
parents.43 While they brought multiple claims, all of them were 
fundamentally based on the idea that ICWA is a law based on race 
rather than citizenship.44 In that light, they further claimed that 
ICWA harms children rather than helps them by keeping them in 
foster care longer; however though there is no data to demonstrate 
that claim. In 2017, the district court dismissed that case for lack of 
standing.45 Also, in 2015, the National Council for Adoption 
brought a similar claim in federal court in Virginia,46 and two other 
cases were filed in federal court attacking state ICWA laws.47 
Plaintiffs have brought three federal lawsuits in Minnesota 
challenging tribal Indian child welfare jurisdiction,48 and this year, 
foster parents and the state of Texas have filed a challenge to ICWA 
in federal district court in Texas.49 
                                                 
40 See S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017), cert denied, 
138 S.Ct. 390 (2017); In re adoption of No. 20150434 B.B., 2017 UT 59, 2017 
WL 3821741 (Utah 2017). 
41 In re M.J., No. 2017AP1697, 2017 WL 6623390 (Wis. Ct. App. 2017); see 
infra Section III, for a description and short analysis of this decision. 
42 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, A.D. v. Washburn (D. Ariz. 
2015) (No. 15-cv-01259). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at *21. 
45 A.D. by Carter v. Washburn, No. 15-cv-01259, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Ariz. 
March 16, 2017); see infra Section III, for a summary of the case. 
46 Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Council for 
Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F.Supp.3d 727 (E.D.Va. 2015) (No. 15-cv-00675). 
47 Doe v. Piper, No. 15-cv-02639, 2017 WL 3381820 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017); 
Order, Doe v. Hembree (N.D. Okla. March 31, 2017) (No. 15-CV-00471).  
48 Petition for Habeas Corpus, Watso v. Jacobson (D. Minn. April 4, 2016) (No. 
16-cv-00983); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Watso v. Piper 
(D. Minn. Feb. 23, 2017) (No. 17-cv-00562); Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Americans for Tribal Court Equality v. Piper (D. Minn. Oct. 
10, 2017) (No. 17-cv-04597). 
49 Prayer for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Texas v. Zinke (N.D. Texas Oct. 
25, 2017) (No. 17-cv-00868). 
   
 
41 
These challenges and federal court cases represent a shift in 
litigation strategy. Prior to 2015, virtually no ICWA cases were filed 
in federal court. While 25 U.S.C. § 1914 allows a parent or tribe to 
bring a case to a “court of competent jurisdiction”(a term undefined 
by the law), if there is a violation of certain parts of the law, federal 
courts generally do not hear these cases since they originate in trial 
courts.50 This move to federal court is problematic for a few reasons.  
The first is that these cases are often brought by a coalition 
of anti-Indian law groups who have determined the emotional 
stories behind some ICWA cases may provide an entry into 
removing federal Indian law protections more broadly. Indeed, 
tribes have tried to access federal courts for years to enforce ICWA 
and have failed.51 The second is that federal court judges very rarely 
hear child welfare cases. When they do, they hear federal child abuse 
and exploitation cases criminal cases that are completely different 
from the civil child-welfare context where ICWA applies. 
Explaining the civil nature of a child-welfare proceeding, that 
eighty-five percent of all state child-welfare cases are based on 
neglect rather than abuse, or that ICWA provides protections to 
children and families in a system that many concede is otherwise 
broken, takes time and briefing space. A federal judge may have 
never seen a dependency case or understand the process of one. 
Finally, these constitutional arguments are now leaking into state 
ICWA cases. Prior to this particular trend, states, tribes, and parents 
litigated what ICWA provisions meant, but they rarely litigated 
whether ICWA was fundamentally sound law. Now tribal attorneys 
on the front lines of ICWA work are facing both the regular 
litigation and protracted Constitutional arguments in both state and 
federal courts.52 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Westlaw shows eleven reported cases in the federal courts discussing the 
“court of competent jurisdiction” provision of ICWA. 
51 See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Superior Court of Wash. BB 10.2.1(f), 47 F. Supp 
.2d 1233 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Comanche Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hovis, 53 F.3d 
298 (10th Cir. 1995); Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 
1985). 
52 See S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569 (Ariz. Ct. App.) cert. denied., subnom 
S.S. v. Colo. River Indian Tribes, 138 S. Ct. 380 (2017); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Superior Court of Tulare Cty, (Nov. 27, 2017) (No. 17-789). 
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III. CASES OF NOTE 
 
The authors have chosen to highlight and summarize the 
cases below because they present relevant issues or sit in a unique 
procedural posture that reflects the current challenges to and 
interpretations of ICWA. The cases are listed in reverse 
chronological order. They address issues of jurisdiction, placement 
preferences, qualified expert witnesses, intervention, and notice. 
Those cases that involve attorneys or groups that are known for their 
aggressive anti-ICWA agenda and reliance on arguments that ICWA 
is unconstitutional are demarcated with an asterisk. A full listing of 
the thirty-four published cases are in section IV. 
 
A. State Cases 
 
In re M.J., Wisconsin Court of Appeals.53 In this termination-of-
parental-rights case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held the father 
was neither protected by § 1912(d) and (f) nor the corresponding 
Wisconsin Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA) provisions, Wis. 
Stat. § 48.028(4)(e)1-2, because the decision in Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl54 governs the case.55 In this case, the county filed a 
termination of parental rights petition and then moved for summary 
judgment, alleging no genuine disputes of material fact existed as to 
whether father had abandoned the child and asserting that the 
termination provisions of ICWA and WICWA were inapplicable 
because father had never had custody of child.56 Father argued the 
ICWA and WICWA provisions were applicable regardless of 
custody and requested a bench trial on those issues.57 The trial court 
granted summary judgment, and father appealed.58  
The court of appeals found that the language of the 
termination provisions of WICWA “contain virtually identical 
language” to ICWA.59 It then found, citing to Baby Girl, that “[b]oth 
sets of statutes plainly indicate their provisions only serve to protect 
a ‘pre-existing’ state of custody and to prevent the ‘discontinuance 
                                                 
53 In re M.J., 379 Wis.2d 750 (Wisc. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017). 
54 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 691(2013).  
55 In re M.J., 379 Wis.2d.  at *9–11. 
56 Id. at *4. 
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
59 Id. at *9. 
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of a relationship.”60 Because father did not dispute whether he ever 
had custody of the child and whether under Wisconsin statute61 he 
had abandoned the child, the court found the protections of ICWA 
and WICWA did not apply to his termination proceeding.62  
 
In re J.J.T., Texas Court of Appeals.63 In this involuntary 
termination of parental rights case, the El Paso Texas Court of 
Appeals held the plain language of 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) allowed the 
tribe to intervene in the middle of the termination of parental rights 
proceeding in question. It also held “the state[’s] procedural rule 
which would deny the right to intervene in a child custody 
proceeding because the tribe did not file a written pleading prior to 
the hearing directly conflicts with [the] purpose [of ICWA],” was 
preempted, and allowed the tribe to intervene by oral motion.64 The 
tribe also appealed because the state failed to provide it notice before 
the proceeding, pursuant to U.S.C. § 1912(a), and because the 
evidence was insufficient to meet the ICWA 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) 
termination-of-parental-rights standard, but the court remanded 
because the lower court erred when it denied the tribe’s motion to 
intervene and did not reach those issues.  
 
In re K.S.D., North Dakota Supreme Court.65 In this termination 
of parental rights case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held 
there was nothing in the record to support ICWA’s termination-of-
parental-rights requirement of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including the testimony of a qualified expert witness that continued 
custody by the parents would likely result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the children.66   
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Wis. Stat. § 48.515(1) (2018). 
62 In re M.J., 379 Wis.2d 750 at *9. The court rejected the father’s argument that 
a provision of WICWA and a provision of the 2016 Federal Regulations 
specifically forbid the court from implementing the Existing Indian Family 
Exception Doctrine. Wis. Stat. § 48.028(3)(a) and 25 C.F.R. § 23.103(c), 
respectively, require the court to apply the entirety of the Act regardless of the 
father’s custody. In re M.J., 379 Wis.2d 750 at *10–11. The court explained the 
Existing Indian Family Doctrine ensures that the Act is applied and the “general 
applicability of ICWA and WICWA to [the father] as a parent of an Indian 
child, however, is a separate from whether” WICWA’s termination provisions 
apply to a parent who has never had custody of an Indian child. Id. at *11.  
63 In re J.J.T., No. 08-17-00162-CV, 2017 WL 6506405 (Tex. App. 2017). 
64 Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
65 In re K.S.D., 904 N.W. 479 (N.D. 2017). 
66 Id. at 488. 
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 The court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the state 
followed ICWA’s § 1912(f) termination standards at the termination 
trial, stating: 
 
Because the Petitioner did not provide testimony 
from a qualified expert witness that the continued 
custody of the children by the parent is likely to result 
in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
children, this ruling is subject to post-judgment 
invalidation under 25 U.S.C. § 1914. Were we to 
affirm the result in this case, even absent a proper 
objection, our affirmance would provide the children 
no certainty or stability because either parent or the 
tribe could collaterally attack the judgment at any 
time.67 
 
The court went on to find that ICWA’s termination standards 
do not preempt state termination law because they can be 
“harmonized” with state law.68 Ultimately the court concluded that 
in ICWA cases, petitioners must “prove the state law grounds for 
termination by clear and convincing evidence, and must prove the 
additional federal requirement beyond a reasonable doubt” as § 
1912(f) requires.69 Because neither of the state child welfare 
workers specifically testified as the qualified expert witness and 
because “the plain terms of the federal law strongly suggest that 
neither…could be an expert witness” the record was void of 
evidence necessary under § 1912(f).70  
 
In re A.F., Fourth District California Court of Appeals.71 In this 
placement-preferences case out of the Fourth District of the 
California Court of Appeals, the court evaluated a letter from the 
Campo Band of Mission Indians that gave a preferred placement for 
a child under 25 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal regulations, and the 2016 
ICWA Guidelines. After the state removed the child from her 
parent’s home, she was placed with a cousin who lived on the 
                                                 
67 Id. at 485.  
68 Id. at 485–86. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 487. 
71 In re A.F., 226 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89 (Ct. App. 2017). 
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reservation.72 The State Child Welfare Agency and Tribe preferred 
this placement and recommended the child remain at that 
placement.73 The paternal grandmother disagreed, filed de facto 
parent papers, and gained standing in the case.74  
 Under ICWA’s definition of extended family member, both 
grandmother and first cousin have equal weight.75 However, the 
Tribe submitted a letter to the court stating it preferred the child stay 
with her cousin. The court determined that under the law, the 2016 
ICWA Regulations, and the 2016 ICWA Guidelines, that the Tribe 
could only change the placement preferences by resolution and that 
the resolution had to be objective and not on a child-by-child basis.76 
The court noted that any tribal-state agreement entered into under 
25 U.S.C. § 1919 would be considered a resolution under the 
Regulations.77  
 
In re B.B., Utah Supreme Court.78 In this case, the Utah Supreme 
Court held, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, that the father 
was a “parent” for purposes of ICWA because he met the federal 
standard for acknowledging paternity.79 Therefore the Court also 
found that under § 1914 the father had the right to petition the court 
to invalidate the action terminating the mother’s parental rights.80  
Using Utah’s general principles of statutory interpretation; 
the court found the plain language of ICWA did not answer the 
question of “what is required for an unmarried biological father to 
be considered a parent for the purposes of ICWA?”81 The court then 
determined that “acknowledge” and “establish,” the terms used in 
ICWA’s 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) definition of parent (and more 
specifically which unwed fathers are parents), are properly 
construed as plain-language terms.82 Because the dictionary 
definitions both lacked a timing element and were otherwise too 
broad and vague, the court turned to federal law for context. 
                                                 
72 Id. at *2. 
73 Id. at *3.  
74 Id. 
75 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (1978). 
76 In re A.F., 226 Cal. Rptr. 3d at *7–8. 
77 Id. at n.10. 
78 In re B.B., 2017 UT 59, 2017 WL 3821741(Utah 2017). 
79 Id. at *22. 
80 Id. at *24. 
81 Id. at *14. 
82 Id. at *17.  
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Adopting the reasoning in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield,83 the court found there was no reason to rely on state law 
definitions for a “critical term” in ICWA because where Congress 
intended a term in that law to be defined by state law, it explicitly 
stated so.84 The court also noted that imputing a state-law definition 
of paternity would “impair” the purpose of ICWA.85 
The court then applied a federal reasonability standard to 
both the time and manner in which unwed fathers may acknowledge 
or establish their paternity and be recognized as parents under 
ICWA.86 In this case, the court deemed the father’s actions both 
timely and sufficient.87 Here, he resided with and provided for the 
birth mother for the first six months of her pregnancy.88 When she 
went to Utah after six months, the plan was that the father would 
join her; but the mother cut off contact and placed the child for 
adoption without informing the father.89 When the father learned of 
the adoption proceedings, he immediately alerted his tribe, 
consulted with a local attorney who referred him to Utah legal 
services with whom he filed a motion to intervene, a motion for 
paternity testing, and a paternity affidavit expressly acknowledging 
that he was the child’s father.90 
The court then determined that 25 U.S.C. § 1914 allows for 
any parent “from whose custody [of a] child was removed” to 
challenge a termination action in an appellate court.  Then finding 
that because the father was a parent, as defined by ICWA, who had 
legal custody of the child by virtue of his paternity (and “to the 
extent he did not have physical custody of the Child, it was because 
of Birth Mother’s misrepresentation”), he could bring his action 
under § 1914.91 Because the father, therefore, had a right to 
intervene in the adoption proceedings—which were involuntary for 
him—the court remanded.92  
This private adoption proceeding also implicated the state-
law issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Namely, whether the court 
                                                 
83 Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
84 In re B.B., 2017 UT 59 at *17. 
85 Id. at *19. 
86 Id. at *20. 
87 Id. at *22. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at *24. 
92 Id. at *25. 
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could void birth mother’s termination of parental rights by holding 
that she failed to give valid consent (because ICWA’s 25 U.S.C. § 
1913 timing requirement was not fulfilled), and therefore, whether 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate her 
parental rights.93 The majority of the court found that the issue was 
not properly before it and therefore failed to reach the merits.94 
Nonetheless, the dissent to Part I of the opinion includes an 
interesting discussion on whether the § 1913 requirement of ten days 
means ten calendar days or ten twenty-four-hour periods.95 
 
In re D.H. Jr., Kansas Supreme Court.96 In this termination of 
parental rights case, the Kansas Supreme Court held that where there 
is evidence that a child may be an “Indian child” as defined by 
ICWA, the court must follow ICWA until the tribe advises the court 
otherwise.97 Finding that the 2015 ICWA Guidelines “control here,” 
the court reasoned that the state had failed to provide adequate notice 
both because it omitted the name, birthdate, and lineage of paternal 
grandmother (with whom the child was placed) and because after 
the tribe requested additional information the state took no steps to 
provide notice as required by those Guidelines (and other state’s 
case law).98 
 
                                                 
93 Id. at *6–11. 
94 Id. at *1. 
95 Id. at *11–13. 
96 In re D.H., 83 N.E.3d 1273 (Kan. 2017). 
97 Id. at *9. 
98 Id. Mother also claimed inadequate assistance of counsel based on the 
behavior of her first attorney, an individual who consented to disbarment after 
his representation of mother was discontinued. Id. at *8 (citing In re Daniel J. 
Arkell, 304 Kan. 754 (2016) (at the time of disbarment, Arkell had five different 
complaints lodged against him)). Counsel folded mother’s no-contest statement 
over so she could not see the allegations to which she was admitting and told her 
“that she needed to sign the document if she wanted to get her child back and 
she did not need to worry about what it said.” Id. at *7. He also advised “she 
should not pursue the issue of whether there was native parentage of her son 
because the tribe would ‘come take her child away.’” Id. The court ultimately 
found that although the attorney’s conduct was “well below” what is permitted 
and that there was “no excuse” for his actions, because the misconduct occurred 
very early in the proceedings and the question at hand is what is in the best 
interest of the child, the district court properly concluded that mother was not 
actually prejudiced. Id. at *8. The court did however, “point out” that “unique to 
this case even if we do not require the State to provide additional information to 
the tribe [concerning paternal grandmother’s name and lineage], Mother has a 
strong argument for remand because her attorney, since disbarred, advised her 
not to pursue notice to the [tribe] under the Act.” Id. at *10. 
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In re L.M.B., Kansas Court of Appeals.99 In this termination-of-
parental-rights case, the Kansas Court of Appeals held the trial court 
should have “followed” the 2015 ICWA Guidelines when 
determining whether a witness fulfills the qualified expert witness 
requirement of ICWA.100 It also found the individual offered as a 
witness, who was a member of the child’s tribe, had a PhD in Native 
American History, teaches Indian studies, and teaches classes on 
ICWA, met the requirements of the first—“and most preferred”—
category of expert delineated in the 2015 ICWA Guidelines.101 In 
addition, the court found the harmless-error rule applies in ICWA 
cases and citing In re Tamika R., 973 A.2d 547, 553 (R.I. 2009), 
held that “the qualified expert testimony at the termination hearing 
effectively cured any possible harm that resulted from not having 
such testimony at the adjudication stage.”102 Notably, Tamika R. 
stands for the opposite proposition—that later expert testimony 
cannot cure a previous violation of ICWA’s QEW requirement.  
The court also “looked to” the 2015 ICWA Guidelines to 
determine what “constitutes” active efforts (those rehabilitative 
efforts that ICWA requires the state social service agency to 
provide).103 After reviewing the fifteen examples provided by the 
BIA, the court found that the efforts ICWA requires the states to 
provide can be grouped into two categories: “(1) active efforts to 
involve the children’s tribe and family members to assure that the 
children’s Indian culture is protected and respected[;] and (2) active 
efforts to keep the family together and help the parents obtain 
necessary resources.”104 The court found, and the parties agreed, that 
the state had provided active efforts to protect children’s 
relationships with family and tribe. Parties disputed whether the 
state did more than “merely create” a case plan for parents.105 In 
spite of testimony that the caseworker had treated this case no 
differently than any other and arguments about the additional efforts 
the caseworker could have provided, the court found that by 
engaging the tribe and extended family, the state had met its burden. 
The court recalled that as it had previously held, “it is simply not the 
                                                 
99 In re L.M.B., 398 P.3d 207 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). 
100 Id. at 217–18. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 223. 
103 Id. at 219. 
104 Id. at 220. 
105 Id. at 221. 
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case that active efforts means absolutely every effort.”106 Of note, to 
assess the active efforts provided, the court reviewed “the State’s 
efforts (through its contractor, St. Francis) related to the case 
plan.”107 The Kansas Supreme Court declined to review this case.    
 
*Gila River Indian Community v. DCS, Arizona Supreme 
Court.108 In this preadoptive/adoptive placement proceeding, the 
Arizona Supreme Court held that § 1911(b), which allows for 
transfer to tribal court, does not apply to state preadoptive and 
adoptive placements. The court went on to hold that the section also 
does not prohibit the transfer of such actions to tribal court.109 The 
court reasoned the plain language of § 1911(b) applies to foster care 
and termination of parental rights proceedings and requires transfer 
absent good cause or parental objection.110 The court then stated that 
“[s]ection 1911(b) is silent as to the discretionary transfer of 
preadoptive and adoptive placement actions, but we do not interpret 
that silence to mean prohibition.”111   
The court then went on to clarify that “tribes have inherent 
authority to hear child custody proceedings involving their own 
children” and that “[a]s a result, although ICWA does not govern 
the transfer of preadoptive and adoptive placement actions, state 
courts may nonetheless transfer such cases involving Indian children 
to tribal court.” The court cited the 2016 ICWA Guidelines and 
Regulations as “support” for this conclusion.112 Although the trial 
court concluded that “good cause” existed to deny the tribe’s motion 
for transfer, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the decision for a 
different reason: the hearing in question was a preadoptive/adoptive 
placement hearing not subject to § 1911(b).113 The court noted, 
however, it had “no occasion here to discuss grounds other than § 
1911(b)—such as Arizona statutes or forum non conveniens 
doctrine—that might support transfer” and that its holding “does not 
                                                 
106 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
107 Id. (emphasis added). 
108 Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Dep't of Child Safety, P.3d. 286, 242 (Ariz. 
2017). 
109 Id. at 288. 
110 Id. at 290.  
111 Id. at 290–91 (emphasis added). 
112 Id. at 291.  
113 Id. at 292. 
   
 
50 
preclude transfer to tribal court of preadoptive or adoptive 
placement [proceedings].”114 
 
In re A.O., South Dakota Supreme Court.115 In this termination-
of-parental-rights case, the South Dakota Supreme Court held the 
lower court’s denial of the mother’s and tribe’s joint request for 
transfer because it was not timely and not in the child’s best interest 
without a hearing was improper.116 The court reasoned that transfer 
is “generally mandatory when requested,” that “the burden to 
establish good cause to the contrary is on the opposing party,” that 
“the determination whether a petition is timely must be made on a 
case-by-case basis,” and that “the court should make specific 
findings.”117 Thus, because the court is “required to consider all the 
particular circumstances of a case, not simply the amount of time 
that had passed since the proceedings first began” the court was 
required to “afford Mother [and tribe] a full opportunity to present 
evidence and argument” before making a determination about both 
timeliness and the children’s best interest.118 
 
*S.S. v. Stephanie H.119 In this private termination of parental rights 
proceeding, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that ICWA §§ 
1912(d) and (f) applies when an ex-husband tries to terminate his 
former wife’s rights to their Indian child for a step-parent 
adoption.120 Reasoning the “plain language does not limit the scope 
[of ICWA] to proceedings brought by state-licensed or public 
agencies,” and that because “Congress explicitly excluded 
dissolution and delinquency proceedings…[h]ad it also intended to 
exclude private termination proceedings…it would have done so 
expressly”,121 the court found ICWA applied. The court also found 
that because ICWA applies to “any action resulting in the 
termination of the parent-child relationship” where parent “means 
any biological parent…of an Indian child” the fact that mother is 
                                                 
114 Id. at 291. 
115 In re A.O., 896 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 2017). 
116 Id. at 656. 
117 Id. at 655. 
118 Id. at 655–56. 
119 S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017). 
120 Id. at 574. 
121 Id. at 573. 
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non-Native is not of consequence.122 This follows a long line of case 
law holding the same. 
 In applying § 1912(d) to the case, the court held 
“[c]onstruing ICWA broadly to promote its stated purpose, we 
interpret the ‘active efforts’ requirement of § 1912 (d) in an 
abandonment proceeding to include informal private initiatives 
aimed at promoting contact… and encouraging [a] parent to 
embrace his or her responsibility to support and supervise the 
child.”123 The court then explains what this may mean:  
 
In the abstract, “active efforts” to prevent a parent 
from abandoning a child might include, inter alia, 
informing the parent about the child's educational 
progress and interests; sending the parent 
photographs of the child; keeping the parent 
informed of irregular but significant expenses, such 
as medical expenses, to which the parent would be 
expected to contribute; and, where appropriate, 
inviting the parent to school and extracurricular 
events and allowing the child to accept 
communications from the parent.124 
 
The court then found that the father—rather than assisting the 
mother in establishing a relationship with the children—had 
forbidden her from contacting him. It also found that the drug and 
alcohol treatment offered were active efforts, but successful (where 
section 1912(d) requires an effort to be unsuccessful).125 Finally, the 
court dispensed with an equal protection argument in two sentences 
concluding both that ICWA is based on “political status and tribal 
sovereignty” and the requirements of ICWA in question in this case 
“are rationally related to the government’s desire to protect the 
integrity of Indian families and tribes.”126 
  The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review this case on 
April 18, 2017. On July 17, 2017, the children, represented by the 
Goldwater Institute filed a Petition for Certiorari to the United States 
                                                 
122 Id. at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
123 Id. at 575.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 575–76.   
126 Id. at 576. 
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Supreme Court. The Court denied the Petition on October 30, 
2017.127 
 
B. Federal Cases 
 
 Because ICWA is implemented in state court, federal cases 
involving the law are usually rare. However, due to a series of 
affirmative attacks on the law in federal court, which started in 2015, 
there have been seven published federal opinions (District Court, 
Appellate Court, and Supreme Court) over the past three years.128 
This article only includes decisions from 2017, but does note when 
a case is currently under appeal.  
 
*A.D. by Carter v. Washburn129  
 In 2015, the Goldwater Institute (the Institute) filed a federal 
class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of ICWA and 
the revised 2016 ICWA Guidelines.130 The proposed class of 
plaintiffs included all Native children who are in foster care in 
Arizona and live off reservation, all foster parents, pre-adoptive, and 
prospective adoptive parents who are not members of the Native 
child’s extended family.131 The Goldwater Institute argued that 
ICWA’s transfer, active efforts, burdens of proof for removal, 
burdens of proof for termination of parental rights, and placement 
preferences provisions, violate equal protection and due process for 
both the children and foster and adoptive families.132  
 The district court held the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring 
the case and dismissed the case.133 The court found the plaintiffs did 
not articulate specific injury in fact to avoid dismissal under federal 
standing doctrines— specifically, the plaintiffs could not provide 
specific facts that any of the ICWA provisions challenged 
specifically delayed placement, adoption, or otherwise harmed the 
children in foster care.134 In addition, though the plaintiffs were 
                                                 
127 S.S., et al. v. Colorado River Indian Tribes, 138 S. Ct. 380 (2017). 
128 Data on file with the authors and journal. 
129 A.D. by Carter v. Washburn, No. 15-cv-01259, 2017 WL 1019685 (D. Ariz. 
March 16, 2017). (On appeal to the Ninth Circuit *Carter v. Washburn, No. 17-
15839.). 
130 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, A.D. v. Washburn, (D. 
Ariz. 2015) (No. 15-cv-01259). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 A.D. by Carter, No. 15-cv-01259, 2017 WL 1019685. 
134 Id. at *11. 
   
 
53 
allowed leave to amend, and claimed there were so many potential 
plaintiffs to make joinder impossible, they were unable to find any 
plaintiffs able to show injury in fact.135 The Institute filed an appeal 
in the Ninth Circuit, which is briefed and awaiting oral argument.136  
  
*Doe v. Piper137 and *Doe v. Hembree138  
 In both of these cases, attorneys representing the biological 
parents of Indian children argued that state ICWA laws requiring 
notice to the child’s tribe and the right of intervention to the tribe 
violated the parents’ rights to privacy. Also, in both of these cases, 
the courts dismissed the cases as moot.  
 
IV. ALL REPORTED CASES 
 
As a federal law implemented by state courts, ICWA holds 
a unique place in child welfare jurisprudence. Included below is a 
comprehensive listing of all reported 2017 state and federal cases 
involving the Indian Child Welfare Act. This quick reference should 
allow busy practitioners the opportunity to quickly find and review 
all new case law on any given ICWA topic that may arise in their 
caseload without the tedious work of searching through fifty 
jurisdictions and numerous topics. 
This survey reinforces what ICWA practitioners know—that 
while the federal cases take a lot of the attention and use anecdotes 
to make broad anti-ICWA arguments, day-to-day ICWA practice 
involves family in crisis and need. A vast majority of ICWA appeals 
are done by parents, hoping the promise and protections of the law 
will help them reunify with their children. Families in poverty run a 
high risk of losing their children. ICWA cannot change that reality, 
but it can force states, and tribes, to provide tailored, useful services 
to those families. The federal lawsuits do nothing to address this 
reality, but instead try to remove a law that provides some of the few 
identifiable protective factors for children and families. Instead, 
what the lawsuits should do is shine a spotlight on a broken child 
welfare system, where ICWA is one of the few laws that provide 
support for families in crisis.  
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 Appellants’ Opening Brief, A.D. by Carter v. Washburn (Ninth Cir. Sept. 1, 
2017) (No. 17-15839). 
137 Doe v. Piper No. 15-cv-02639, 2017 WL 3381820 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017). 
138 Order, Doe v. Hembree (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2017) (No. 15-CV-00471). 
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A. State Cases 
  
 Unreported cases and those that were reported but only to 
clarify the child involved was not ICWA-eligible have not been 
included. Those cases that involve entities who are a part of the 
organized efforts to dismantle ICWA (e.g., The Goldwater Institute 
and American Academy of Adoption Attorneys) are denoted with 
an asterisk “*”.   
 
Title, citation        
 Date of Decision 
Court         
 Named Tribe139 
 
Active Efforts 
*S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 241 Ariz. 419    
 Jan. 12, 2017  
Arizona Court of Appeals      
 Colorado River Indian Tribes 
Arizona Supreme Court Denied Petition for Review April 
18, 2017.   
Petition for Certiorari filed with U.S. Supreme Court July 
17, 2017. Docket No: 17-95 
 
In re L.M.B., 398 P.3d 207, 2017 WL2617155    
 June 16, 2017  
Kansas Court of Appeals       
 Citizen Potawatomi    
 Petition for Review filed with Kansas Supreme Court   
 
In re M.L.M., 388 P3d 1226, 283 Or App 353    
 Jan 11, 2017  
                                                 
139 The “named tribe” is the most specific information available in the case, and 
there is “reason to believe” the child might be an Indian child. Future drafts of 
this document will indicate whether the tribe initiated the appeal or not. An 
“unnamed” tribe means the tribe’s name does not appear in the opinion. An 
“unknown” tribe means the parent does not know the tribe’s name but has stated 
there is a tribal affiliation.  
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Oregon Court of Appeals      
 Choctaw Nation 
Petition for Review with Oregon Supreme Court Denied 
April 27, 2017.  
395 P3d 11, 316 Or 439 
 
Child Custody Proceeding  
In re M.R., 7 Cal App 5th 868, 212 Cal Rptr 3d 807    
 Jan. 20, 2017  
California Court of Appeals 4th District    
 Unnamed Tribe  
 
Indian Custodian 
In re E.R., __Cal.Rptr.3d__, 2017 WL 6506974   
 Dec. 20, 2017 
California Court of Appeals 1st District    
 Cloverdale Rancheria 
 
Inquiry and Notice 
In re Breanna S., 8 Cal. App. 5th 636, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98  
 Feb. 14, 2017  
California Court of Appeals 2nd District    
 Pascua Yaqui 
 
In re J.L., 10 Cal. App. 5th 913, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201  
 April 5, 2017   
California Court of Appeals 4th District     
 Unknown Tribe  
 
In re L.L., 395 P3d 1209, 2017 WL 1089561    
 March 23, 2017 
Colorado Court of Appeals      
 Apache 
 
In re A.D., 413 P.3d 290, 2017 WL 1739170    
 May 4, 2017   
Colorado Court of Appeals       
 Unnamed Tribe  
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In re D.H. Jr., 401 P.3d 163, 2017 WL 3327067   
 Aug. 4, 2017  
Kansas Court of Appeals      
 Cherokee Nation 
 
Adoption of Uday, 70 N.E.3d 928, 91 Mass. App. Ct 51  
 Feb.16, 2017  
Appeals Court of Massachusetts     
 Cherokee Nation 
 
In Interest of C.C., 2017 WL 3184319    
 June 30, 2017   
Court of Appeals of Texas      
 Unnamed 
 
In re A.G., 2017 WL 3085084     
 July 20, 2017  
Ohio Court of Appeals      
 Unnamed 
 
Michelle M. v. Dept. of Child Safety, 401 P.3d 1013, 243 Ariz. 64 
 Aug. 31, 2017 
Arizona Court of Appeals      
 Navajo Nation/Oglala  
 Sioux/Spirit Lake 
 
In re L.W.S., 804 S.E.2d 816, 2017 WL 3863197   
 Sept. 5, 2017 
North Carolina Court of Appeals     
 Cherokee Nation 
 
In re C.A., __P.3d__, 2017 COA 135     
 Oct. 19, 2017 
Colorado Court of Appeals      
 Unnamed  
 
In re K.G., __P.3d__, 2017 COA 153    
 Nov. 30, 2017 
Colorado Court of Appeals  
 Cherokee Nation/Choctaw Nation 
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Intervention  
In re J.J.T., 2017 WL 6506405, __ S.W.3d __    
 December 20, 2017 
Texas Court of Appeals       
 Navajo Nation  
 
Foster Care Proceeding  
In re L.L., 395 P3d 1209, 2017 WL 1089561    
 March 23, 2017  
Colorado Court of Appeals      
 Apache 
 
In re Detmer/Beaudry, ___NW2d___, 2017 WL 3614234  
 Aug. 22, 2017 
Michigan Court of Appeals      
 Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians 
 
Guardianship Proceeding  
Jude M. v. State, DHSS, OCS, 394 P3d 543, 2017 WL 1533373  
 April 28, 2017  
Alaska Supreme Court      
 Unnamed Tribe  
 
Paternity 
 
In re B.B., __P.3d__, 2017 WL 3821741    
 Aug. 31, 2017 
Utah Supreme Court 
 Colorado River Sioux Tribe 
 Stayed pending a United States Supreme Court Petition for 
 Certiorari       
   
 
Placement Preferences  
In re J.J.W., 902 NW2d 901, 2017 WL 2491888   
 June 8, 2017  
Michigan Court of Appeals 
 Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians 
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In re C.B.D., 387 Mont. 347, 394 P3d 202     
 9-May 2017   
Montana Supreme Court       
 Crow Tribe 
 
In re P.F., 405 P3d 755, 2017 WL 3668103    
 Aug 24, 2017 
Utah Court of Appeals      
 Cherokee Nation 
 
Termination of Parental Rights 
Bob S. v. State, DHHS, OCS, 400 P3d 99, 2017 WL 3202761 
 July 28, 2017 
Alaska Supreme Court      
 Native Village of Selawik 
 
In re S.E., 527 S.W.3d 894       
 Sept. 12, 2017 
Missouri Court of Appeals      
 Nenana Native Village 
 
In re M.J., 2017 WL 6623390      
 December 28, 2017 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals      
 Lac du Flambeau of Lake Superior Chippewa 
 
In re A.J.B., 414 P.3d 552, 2017 UT App 237    
 December 29, 2017 
Utah Court of Appeals      
 Ute Indian Tribe 
 
Transfer 
In re A.O., 896 N.W.2d 652, 2017 WL 2290151   
 May 24, 2017   
South Dakota Supreme Court      
 Oglala Sioux Tribe 
 
*Gila River Indian Community v. DCS, 395 P.3d. 286, 242 Ariz. 277
 June 13, 2017  
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Arizona Supreme Court      
 Gila River Indian Community 
 
Qualified Expert Witness  
 
In re L.M.B., 398 P.3d 207, 2017 WL2617155    
 June 16, 2017 
Kansas Court of Appeals       
 Citizen Potawatomi   
   
 
Caitlin E. v. State, DHHS, OCS, 399 P.3d 646, 2017 WL 2609221  
 Jun 16, 2017  
Alaska Supreme Court  
Orutsaramiut Native Council 
 
In re D.B., 414 P.3d 46, 2017 COA 139    
 Nov. 2, 2017 
Colorado Court of Appeals       
 Navajo Nation  
 
In re K.S.D., 904 N.W. 479, 2017 ND 289    
 Dec. 2, 2017 
North Dakota Supreme Court      
 Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
 
Withdrawing Consent 
In re J.J.W., 902 N.W.2d 901, 2017 WL 2491888   
 8-Jun 2017  
Michigan Court of Appeals  
 Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians 
On appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court 
 
B. Federal Cases 
 
Constitutionality of ICWA 
*A.D. by Carter v. Washburn, No. 15-cv-01259, 2017 WL 1019685 
(D. Ariz. March 16, 2017)  
 Navajo Nation, Gila River Indian Community 
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On appeal to the Ninth Circuit *Carter v. Washburn, No. 17-
15839. 
Emergency Proceedings 
 
Oglala Sioux v. Fleming, 993 F.Supp.2d 1017 (D.S.D. 2014); 100 
F.Supp.3d 749 (D.S.D. 2015); 220 F.Sup.3d 986 (D.S.D. Dec. 15, 
2016)  
 Oglala Sioux Rosebud Sioux 
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit. Oglala Sioux v. Fleming, 
Nos. 17-1135, 1136, 1137. 
 
Notice and Intervention in Voluntary Proceedings 
*Doe v. Piper, No. 15-cv-02639, 2017 WL 3381820 (D. Minn. Aug. 
4, 2017)  
 Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe 
 
*Doe v. Hembree, Order, No. 15-CV-00471 (N.D. Okla. March 31, 
2017) 
 Cherokee Nation 
